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Review Essay

The Utility of Nuclear Weapons Today: Two
Views
José de Arimatéia da Cruz

Books Reviewed:
No Use: Nuclear Weapons
and US National Security.
By Thomas M. Nichols
Atomic Assistance: How
“Atoms for Peace” Programs
Cause Nuclear Insecurity.
By Matthew Fuhrmann

M

y colleague Steven Metz recently wrote a very thought provoking piece, entitled “Thinking About Catastrophe: The
Army in a Nuclear Armed World.” Metz argues, “nothing is
more important to American security than nuclear weapons. Despite all
the fretting over terrorism, hybrid threats, and conventional aggression,
only nuclear weapons can threaten the existence of the United States and
destroy the global economy.”1 Indeed, despite the end of the Cold War
and nuclear hostilities between the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the topic of nuclear weapons is vital today. Not a day
goes by without reference to nuclear weapons in national and international newspapers. For example, the New York Times, in its February 18,
2016 online edition, reported that Belgium police discovered ten hours
of video purportedly showing a Belgian nuclear official at the home of
the Paris attacker, Thierry Werts. Belgium officials argued the terrorist
organization network “involved in the coordinated attacks on November
13, 2015, that left 130 dead may also have intended to obtain radioactive
material for terrorist purposes.”2
Terrorist organizations attempting to acquire nuclear weapons
to carry out their nefarious activities, and renegade nation-states also
continue to challenge the international system and international law
by attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. The most recent example
occurred on February 7, 2016, when the “hermit kingdom” of North
Korea tested a nuclear bomb and launched a satellite, provoking sharp
condemnations from Russia and China as well as South Korea. Despite
the fact nuclear weapons could be considered obsolete since an attack
by one country could result in massive retaliation by another, the United
States maintains a huge nuclear arsenal on high alert and ready for war.
The two books considered in this review discuss the utility of nuclear
weapons in the post-Cold War era.
No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National Security, by Thomas M.
Nichols, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War
College in Newport, examines the current state of US nuclear doctrine
1      Steven Metz, “Strategic Insights: Thinking About Catastrophe: The Army in a Nuclear Armed
World,” Strategic Studies Institute, December, 14, 2015, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.
mil/index.cfm/articles/Thinking-About-Catastrophe/2015/12/14.
2      Milan Schreuer and Alissa J. Rubin, “Police Find Video of Nuclear Official at Home of
Terrorism Suspect,” New York Times, February, 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/
world/europe/belgium-nuclear-official-video-paris-attacks.html?ref=world.
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and strategy, the effects of American thinking about nuclear weapons
on international security, and the various ways the United States might
reduce the overall threat of nuclear weapons.
(12) Why is it so difficult for the major
powers, and the United States in particular,
to break their nuclear addiction? What role
should nuclear weapons play in America’s
national security? These are the central questions guiding No Use. (5) While the United
States has reduced its nuclear stockpiles,
it still maintains a considerable number of
them.
Are nuclear weapons still relevant in
the post-Cold War world? Nichols has his
doubts. He argues Cold War-era precepts
about nuclear weapons have continued to
dominate security policy and nuclear strategies by default. (6) While they may still be
Thomas M. Nichols, No Use: Nuclear
Weapons and US National Security
considered a good deterrence mechanism,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
other nations may see nuclear weapons as
Press, 2014) 217pgs. $39.95
aggressive tools in the military arsenal of its
opponents. For example, Russian officials, despite their displeasure with
North Korea for its most recent nuclear test and satellite launch, believe
the “North Korean regime is simply fighting for its own survival, using
the logic that when a pack of wolves attacks you, only a fool lowers his
gun.”3 Nichols succinctly argues, “deterrence will not be strengthened
by creating smaller or more accurate nuclear bombs or by drawing up
military senseless campaigns of desultory nuclear strikes.” (157)
Nichols believes a nuclear Armageddon, in the current international system, is unlikely to take place between nation-states. In fact, he
contends that without a real threat to the American civilization itself,
“nuclear weapons are now more an instrument of choice rather than
[of] necessity.” (11) Still, he does not take into consideration the possibility terrorist organizations or violent non-states actors may attempt
to acquire nuclear weapons to use against their enemies. Nichols proposes the United States re-evaluate what national security means in the
context of the post-Cold War international system. For Nichols, a key
component to reforming the traditional US notion of national security
is an examination of the utility of nuclear weapons. As Nichols argues,
“reforming US nuclear doctrine is the key not only to the reform of US
national security policy, but also to the reduction of nuclear arsenals and
the prevention of the wider spread of nuclear weaponry.” (8)
Obviously, what Nichols is calling for is the US Government to
reduce its nuclear stockpile in light of the insignificance of nuclear
weapons in the twenty-first century as a weapon of choice if a conflict
were to break-out. This proposition is not without its detractors. And,
Nichols recognizes that when he argues:
...removing nuclear weapons from their pride of place will require a fundamental change in the way Americans and others think about their security.
3      George Toloraya, “A Neighborly Concern: Russia’s Evolving Approach to Korean Problems,”
http://38north.org/2016/02/gtoloraya021816.
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Efforts to change the Cold War nuclear paradigm will encounter significant political, ideological, and bureaucratic obstacles, because reducing the
importance of nuclear weapons will involve remaking American security
strategy as a whole. (10)

However, without the US Government taking a leadership role as
opposed to “leading from behind,” there will not be a reduction in
nuclear weapons among the “nuclear club.”
Moreover, Nichols explains, “only the United States, with its
fortunate geopolitical advantages, its unique position of international
leadership, and its huge qualitative edge in nuclear matters can meaningfully lead any kind of change in global norms about the purpose and
meaning of nuclear arms.” (11)
While many countries and proponents of nuclear weapons propose
that nuclear weapons are not weapons of war, but weapons of deterrence, Nichols disagrees. Instead, he argues deterrence is by its nature
imprecise, “but every administration claims it is doing only what is
necessary to defend the country, and no more or less.” (70) Nichols
further argues US policy-makers and nuclear enthusiasts subscribe to
the idea of “calculated ambiguity.” (56) Calculated ambiguity was put
into practice in the 1990s to respond to the threats of nuclear attacks
if carried out by smaller nations. Calculated ambiguity was designed to
be vague, deliberately obscuring whether “Washington would resort to
nuclear retaliation as punishment for attacks against the United States,
its military forces, or its allies” if the attacks were carried out by smaller
states using chemical or biological weapons–otherwise known as “poor
man’s bombs.” (56)
If nuclear weapons have lost strategic deterrence value in the postCold War international system of the twenty-first century, the question
becomes: what should the United States new strategic nuclear policy
look like? Are nuclear weapons still relevant? Nichols quotes General
V. K. Singh, Chief of the Indian Army, who said in 2012 that “nuclear
weapons are not for warfighting. They have got a strategic significance
and that is where it should be.” (109) According to Nichols, the first
and most important step the President of the United States should do
is to declare a doctrine of minimum deterrence. (110) The doctrine of
minimum deterrence argues:
...the only use for American nuclear weapons would be to deter the use of
other nuclear weapons against the United States, and failing that, they would
be used purely for retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack that could
threaten the national existence of the United States. (110-11)

In the final analysis, Nichols argues, “an American doctrine of minimum
deterrence will not only bring US declaratory policy into line with political reality, it will represent the final abandoning of both the pretense,
and the burden, of adhering to Cold War nuclear maxims.” (177)
Matthew Fuhrmann’s Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs
Cause Nuclear Insecurity takes a different stance. Nuclear technology has
dual utility, that is to say, it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to
build nuclear weapons. “Nuclear technology, materials, and know-how
are dual use in nature, meaning they have both peaceful and military
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application.”(2) Furhmann argues politico-strategic factors drive nuclear
marketplace:
Countries provide atomic assistance to enhance their political influence by
strengthening recipient countries and improving their bilateral relationships
with those states. In particular, suppliers use aid [nuclear] to reinforce their
allies and alliances, to forge partnerships with enemies of enemies, and to
strengthen existing democracies (if the supplier is also a democracy). (239)

Furhmann goes on to claim “suppliers also barter nuclear technology
for oil when they are worried about their energy security.” (239) Despite
the recognition of nuclear technology’s dual nature, countries regularly
engage in “peaceful nuclear cooperation,” which Furhmann defines
as “state-authorized transfer of technology, materials, or know-how
intended to help the recipient country develop, successfully operate, or
expand a civil nuclear program.” (2)
His book discusses the use of economic statecraft to achieve foreign policy
objectives and the ways in which attempts
to influence the behavior of other states
can have unintended consequences for
international security. (239) Furhmann’s
work covers an important topic in the
twenty-first century, that is, it makes a
contribution toward our understanding of
the causes and effects of atomic peaceful
nuclear assistance. But, most importantly,
Furhmann’s main contribution to the
existing literature on nuclear proliferation
is the fact his book is the first of its kind
to “explore the supply side of the nuclear
proliferation.” (6) Furthermore, the book
emphasizes the proliferation potential of
Matthew Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance:
peaceful nuclear assistance—as opposed
How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause
Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca: Cornell
to indigenously acquired nuclear capabiliUniversity Press, 2012). 319pgs. $82.95
ties or deliberate proliferation assistance.
(6)
Furhmann’s Atomic Assistance is guided by the following research
questions: Why do nuclear suppliers provide peaceful nuclear assistance
to other countries? Does peaceful nuclear assistance raise the likelihood
of nuclear weapons proliferation? Have international institutions influenced the nuclear marketplace and effectively separated the peaceful and
military uses of the atom?
In reply, he argues peaceful nuclear cooperation warrants special
reflection for at least two reasons. First, policy-makers believe civilian
nuclear assistance can transform bilateral relationships. This transformation can be for better or worse depending on the country which is
receiving the peaceful nuclear cooperation. Furhmann contends that
countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear cooperation are
more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb, especially if they experience
an international crisis after receiving aid.
Second, the proliferation potential of nuclear technology makes
atomic assistance a unique tool of economic statecraft. In other words,
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Furhmann argues nuclear peaceful cooperation “is simultaneously
helpful and potentially dangerous for international security.” (5) Since
nuclear peaceful proliferation could have a detrimental impact on world
stability, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere who are concerned about proliferation need to understand the connection between
civilian and military nuclear programs.
Furhmann draws on several cases of “Atoms for Peace” in the book.
Some of the cases include US civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from
1957 to 1979, prior to the Iranian Revolution which brought to power
the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mūsavi Khomeini; the Brazilian
nuclear exports to Iran from 1975 to 1981; Brazilian and German nuclear
agreements to build Angra III in 1975; and the controversial US nuclear
cooperation agreement with India from 2001 to 2008.
As former President George W. Bush put it, US-Indian nuclear cooperation would “deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our
two nations.” (104-105) The nuclear peaceful agreement between the
United States and India also raised concerns for neighboring Pakistan
and China. For Pakistan, a nuclear India is unacceptable, but China is
seen by India as a constant irritant and a rising influence in Asia.
Brazil and Iraq signed a peaceful nuclear agreement in January
1980. This agreement required Brazil to provide technology for uranium
exploration and to train Iraqi scientists. Furthermore, the agreement
specified Brazil would supply unprocessed and enriched uranium and
offer assistance in the construction of nuclear reactors. (112) While
such an agreement had tremendous ramifications for Brazil’s role in the
international system, it was a zero-sum game for which Brazil could not
escape. At the time the nuclear agreement was signed, Brazil imported
roughly 80 percent of its oil and Iraq provided 40 percent. Therefore,
Furhmann argues, Brazil “aiding the Iraqi civilian nuclear program
could help Brazil secure a stable oil supply” and “Brazil’s thirst for oil
made it difficult to say no to Iraqi requests for nuclear assistance.” (114)
The Brazil-Germany agreement was heavily criticized by the United
States as “a reckless move that could set off a nuclear arms race in Latin
America, trigger the nuclear arming of a half-dozen nations elsewhere
and endanger the security of the United States and the world as a whole.”
(119)
Both Thomas M. Nichols’ No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National
Security and Matthew Fuhrmann’s Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for
Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity are highly recommended. Given
present-day attempts by rogue nations to pursue their dreams of possessing nuclear weapons for deterrence or for legitimate purposes, as it is
often claimed, nuclear discussions once again are dominating the political debate by political experts and pundits alike. North Korea’s recent
launching of a satellite into orbit has been seen as “a cover for testing
a long-range missile, and the test of a nuclear device, the fourth such,
which took place on January 6th.”4 US Secretary of State John Kerry
condemned North Korea’s actions as “reckless and dangerous,” and
other nations at the UN Security Council called North Korea’s actions
4      “China, North Korea, and America: Between Punxsutawney and Pyongyang,” The Economist
(February 13-19, 2016): 33-34
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irresponsible. The international community has been unable to prevent
North Korea’s continual misbehavior.
Furhmann eloquently points out that, despite the establishment of
the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 and other nuclear safeguards, international institutions have had a limited effect in reducing the dangers
of atomic assistance for nuclear weapons proliferation. (207) Therefore,
it is no surprise that the nuclear debate continues into the twenty-first
century.

